Global Strategy - blog

Universities are (certainly) not isolated from societies. The links are, at least, two kinds. First, the number and breadth of universities (e.g. as measured by teacher per potential student ratio) is primarily a function of the size of suitable population (i.e. how many literate inhabitants between ages 18-25 exist), wealth of the society (as measured by GDP per capita), and a number of more fuzzy factors such as policy decisions and international competition. Second, university education and research have certain functions in economic growth (which is needed for a larger number of professorships, for instance). Most noteworthy, universities educate a large number of individuals for different tasks in the society. What kind of education is given / needed is mostly a random process: as the future needs can not (logically) be forecasted it makes sense to produce excess capacity which may be needed in some future situation. For example, the investment to maintain certain humanistic areas such as languages is relative low vis-à-vis a situation in which those skills would be needed but no process would exist (I guess the CIA faced this problem after the September 11th 2001). In any case, individuals with a university education percolate into various tasks in administration, business, educational sector etc.; then, somewhat mystically, higher education emerges as an antecedent for economic growth. Similarly, the research conducted at universities may result in concrete improvements of knowledge and technology; at least most research is not harmful for societal development (yet see this: Reflections on a Crisis). And if we believe in Lucas, in a century or so, all economies would be equally rich with a large-scale university system (or similar) in each.

Accordingly, as an evolutionary process (or development story) universities are rather easily comprehended. Another question is the form of university level research and education. For example, in the history of Prussia (see: Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia) universities and other similar educational arrangements had important ideological tasks in the formation of the nation. In a sense, each individual working or studying in the higher education institutions were embedded in a patriotic mission in which they served the society in different roles. What is important, however, is the almost pure public good nature of these educational institutions. That is, universities did not compete directly for students or prestige but were subjects of nation state building. On the contrary, in England and the US university system emerged as differently; emphasizing individualism and competition as the primary motors of scientific or cultural development. At least, universities were less dominated by societal (practically governmental) expectations than in Germany and France.

Albeit I draw the contradiction between Anglo-American and German university systems with large strokes, it gives an interesting perspective to the most recent convergence in the forms of university research and education. Practically all developed countries – even Germany – have adopted similar practices than some of the dominant US schools. A concrete sign of this development are the so-called university reforms in Western Europe. Practically all reforms are characterized by (a) increasing emphasis on university level competitiveness (versus a national service function); (b) mergers towards larger universities; and (c) expectations of efficiency and coherence in research and teaching. In Finland, the Aalto University is a flagship project manifesting all these symptoms. It is (a) merger that (b) aims to improve the competitiveness (e.g. in terms of rankings) and (c) efficiency and coherence in teaching and research.

The problem in the Aalto –project is that most of the real problems in the previous three universities (TKK, Helsinki School of Economics; Helsinki University of Art and Design) are such that the merger does not help. For example, integrating three notoriously inflexible administrations seems not to be way for more flexible and service-oriented culture? The film art department’s research quality was estimated very negatively in the recent RAE process yet the question is to what extent the merger has anything to do with that problem? Also, the merger has opened a Pandora’s box in terms of politicking – when professors are unleashed in rent seeking the results are horrifying. This merger-related excess activity may even hinder the development of the units that have already reached a high level of research activities (what Aalto offers, for example, to physicists).

Aalto –project is a typical elite project as sketched by C Wright Mills. Namely, the merger is not a function of any market-based or emergent structural process that would determine an 'optimal' solution for higher education and research. On the contrary, historians will identify a limited number of individuals representing industry associations (i.e. big corporations), governmental institutions (i.e. political machinery) and some willing academics (or rather persons who work at the universities) who drove the process to the point it was still manageable (meaning the period before the merger). Accordingly to Mills, these individuals rarely acknowledge (at least intentionally) that they do not necessarily represent any universal rationality as they are embedded in their own interests: "to ask a man suddenly to divest himself of these interests and sensibilities is almost like asking a man to become a woman." (p. 258) Another, lot nastier, angle would be to see these individuals as simply driven by hubris: any outrageous act or exhibition of pride or disregard for basic moral laws.

An optimist (or fool) could hope that this process does not lead to downward spiral or folly as the hubris usually ends in the ancient narratives. Yet if hubris and elite projects are potentially folly, what would be an alternative? From the existing evolutionary and strategic management literatures, we know at least the following: (1) Maintain consistency when changing direction. This assumption means that both too much change or too little is potentially dangerous; (2) Let the market decide: if young individuals are primarily interested in arts or marketing let this drive investment decisions. Most probably, 30 000 high school graduates know better about the future than 10 members of the 'power elite'. (3) Do not build on prospects: strengthen the already strong areas and do not hope the weakest would prosper (this does not count in emerging units). That is, the historical and present state of university units is the only logical guideline for the future. I doubt if any of these maxims was thought of before this all started.